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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court 
ruling on an attorneys' fee application following the 
settlement of a complicated class action that resulted in a 
$9.5 million settlement for the benefit of the named 
plaintiffs and unnamed class members. In accordance with 
their agreement with their clients (the class 
representatives), and the terms of the class action notice to 
which no class member objected, plaintiffs' attorneys 
("Counsel") applied for attorneys' fees, amounting to one- 
third of the settlement amount, and approximately 
$300,000 in costs. The District Court approved the 
settlement and Counsel's request for reimbursement of 
costs, but allowed fees of only 18% of the settlement fund, 
or $1.71 million--far less than the $3.16 million to which 
the plaintiffs and class members had agreed (or at least, 
not objected to). 
 
Counsel's papers forcefully portray this case as extremely 
difficult, their labors as extensive, and the results achieved 
for the class as quite favorable. Despite this portrayal, 
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supported by voluminous documentation and the absence 
of objection, the District Court explained its decision to 
virtually halve the requested fee award in a conclusory one- 
sentence statement: "The nature of this litigation, its 
resolution at this stage without the necessity of trial, the 
nature of the settlement, and its value, convince the court 
that it would place a reasonable burden on the class to 
award attorneys' fees of 18% of the Settlement Fund, or 
$1,700,000." Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp. , Civ. No. 
95-438 (WHW), at 3 (D. N.J. Nov. 16, 1999). 
 
The Court slightly expanded upon that statement in an 
order denying a motion for reconsideration, stating that it 
had examined the record carefully before making its award 
and that it did not "credit the unexplained and undetailed 
expenditure of 2500 hours by counsel . . . ." Gunter v. 
Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), at 2 (D. 
N.J. Dec. 29, 1999) (citing the 2500 hours allegedly 
expended by one of the attorneys as a "mere[ ] . . . 
hindsight prop"). While refusing to credit these hours, the 
Court declined Counsel's invitation to review billing records 
that Counsel had offered to provide the Court in their initial 
fee application. Moreover, the Court did not explain why it 
refused to credit 2500 hours of the approximately 8500 
hours Counsel had worked on the case, even though 
Counsel proffered documentation for that work. 
 
On appeal, Counsel submit that the District Court failed 
adequately to explain its reasons for declining to grant their 
requested fee award, and that it did not apply the relevant 
criteria for determining such an award. Our jurisprudence 
in this area requires a " `thorough judicial review of fee 
applications . . . in all class action settlements.' " In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 
283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting In re General Motors Corp. 
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
819 (3d Cir. 1995)). Without a reasoned and documented 
explication of the rationale for approving or denying a 
particular fee award, it is difficult, if not impossible, for an 
appellate court to review such an award for abuse of 
discretion. 
 
Such is the case here. The District Court's opinion 
making the fee award and its subsequent opinion denying 
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reconsideration are vague and conclusory. These opinions 
do not address or apply the relevant criteria, established by 
our jurisprudence, that a district court should consider in 
awarding attorneys' fees in a class action. Under the 
circumstances, we cannot properly review the 
reasonableness of the fee award. We will therefore vacate 
the challenged order and remand for proceedings consistent 






This case arises from a series of failed oil and gas 
investments. The named plaintiffs as well as the unnamed 
class members were investors in a series of limited 
partnerships involving oil and gas interests formed and 
promoted by the defendants named in the caption. 
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants fraudulently 
marketed and sold approximately $150 million worth of 
interests in the partnerships between 1986 and 1990. The 
plaintiffs brought suit in January 1995, alleging violations 
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
("RICO") and SS 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the "Securities Exchange Act"). The complaint 
also asserted pendent state law claims for fraud and deceit, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation. 
In terms of relief, the plaintiffs sought damages as well as 
the imposition of a constructive trust. 
 
Discovery and pretrial motion practice ensued for the 
next several years. Counsel's papers reflect that they 
traveled across the country performing myriad tasks related 
to the case, including defending depositions and deposing 
numerous witnesses; conducting informal background 
investigations into the defendants' allegedly fraudulent 
scheme; reviewing voluminous documentary evidence; 
meeting with clients and potential class members; and 
retaining and consulting with experts in the areas of 
geology, oil and gas production, and oil and gas reservoirs. 
Counsel also document that they spent a great deal of time 
litigating pretrial issues before the Magistrate Judge and 
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District Judge assigned to the case. Most notably, Counsel 
point to the fact that they successfully argued a motion to 
certify the class, and that they were victorious in litigating 
several key discovery disputes. 
 
In 1997, both sides moved for partial summary 
judgment. After further discovery, the District Court denied 
the plaintiffs' motion, and granted summary judgment for 
the defendants with respect to the plaintiffs' claims under 
the Securities Exchange Act and the breach of fiduciary 
duty claim brought against one of the defendants. The 
Court denied the defendants' motion with respect to the 
plaintiffs' RICO and other state law claims. Counsel submit 
that their efforts to defend against summary judgment on 
their clients' RICO claims are noteworthy for, during the 
pendency of this litigation, Congress enacted the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104- 
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 77z- 
1 to 78u-5), and the Supreme Court issued a RICO 
decision, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997), 
both of which could have been interpreted as barring the 
plaintiffs' RICO claims. Yet, according to Counsel, they were 
able to convince the District Court that neither the Act nor 
Klehr barred their clients' claims, even though case law 
from other jurisdictions appeared to hold otherwise. 
 
The District Court thereafter set a trial date, and the 
parties revived settlement talks that had been ongoing since 
the inception of the litigation. Settlement discussions had 
initially stalled because the defendants had informed 
Counsel that they lacked the financial resources to fund 
any settlement in excess of $1 million. Eventually, however, 
the parties' discussions proved successful, and in June 
1999, Counsel procured, and their clients agreed to, a 
settlement of $9.5 million. According to the "Notice of 
Proposed Settlement of Class Action," which was sent to 
plaintiffs and class members, but was not an "expression of 
opinion by the [District] Court on the merits of the 
Litigation or the Proposed Settlement," App. at 87, the 
"plaintiffs' damages expert" estimated that"the total loss of 
investment principal sustained by the Class [was] equal to 
approximately $18.7 million. The proposed settlement 
amount of $9.5 million represents more than half of that 
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amount." Id. at 89. The settlement provided for payments 
by the defendants over four years, including $4 million that 
was paid on June 30, 1999; $1.5 million that was due on 
or before June 30, 2000; $1.5 million due on or before 
June 30, 2001; $1.25 million due on or before June 30, 
2002; and $1.25 million due on or before June 30, 2003. 
According to the settlement terms, Counsel remain 





Having successfully resolved their clients' action, Counsel 
submitted to the District Court a fee and cost award 
application, which was accompanied by extensive 
declarations detailing the nature, quality, and amount of 
work that Counsel had performed. Based on the alleged 
lengths that Counsel went to prosecute their clients' case, 
the claimed difficulty of the case and excellence of the 
result achieved, and the size of fee awards in similar cases, 
Counsel requested a cost award of roughly $300,000, and 
a fee award of 33 1/3% of the $9.5 million settlement. 
According to Counsel, their requested fee award was not 
excessive in that it only represented approximately 1.1 
times their "lodestar" amount; i.e., the number of hours 
that Counsel reasonably had worked on plaintiffs' case 
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate they could charge 
for such services on the market. Counsel also sent to the 
plaintiffs and class members, in a form approved by the 
Court, a "Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action," 
informing them that Counsel would request the award of 
legal fees "not to exceed 33 and 1/3%" of the settlement 
award. App. at 89. The notice explained procedures for 
objecting to Counsel's application, but none of the plaintiffs 
or class members raised any objections. Counsel argued to 
the District Court that their fee request was fair and 
reasonable when one took all of these factors into account. 
 
In a terse opinion, the District Court approved Counsel's 
request for costs, but set the fee award at 18% of the 
settlement fund, or $1.71 million, which was to be paid 
with interest over time. The Court's analysis, in full, was as 
follows: 
 
                                6 
  
        This court has carefully reviewed the submissions of 
       plaintiffs' counsel, their stated efforts required to settle 
       this litigation, and the number of hours expended. The 
       nature of this litigation, its resolution at this stage 
       without the necessity of trial, the nature of the 
       settlement, and its value, convince the court that it 
       would place a reasonable burden on the class to award 
       attorneys' fees of 18% of the Settlement Fund, or 
       $1,700,000. Additionally, the request for interest is 
       granted because the settlement involves yearly 
       payments by the defendants until 2003 and plaintiffs' 
       attorneys will only receive their fees as money is paid 
       into the escrow account. The court also grants 
       plaintiffs' attorneys' request for reimbursement of their 
       expenses in the amount of $158,152.65 for the Law 
       Offices of G. Martin Meyers and $142,063.29 for 
       Goodkind, Labaton, Rudoff & Sucharow LLP. 
 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), 
at 3 (D. N.J. Nov. 16, 1999). 
 
Counsel moved for reconsideration, contending that the 
18% fee award represented a penalty to Counsel, because 
it entitled them to only 55% of their lodestar. The District 
Court rejected this argument, writing, 
 
       The Court considered all relevant factors at the time 
       the fee was set, including the lodestar and the efforts 
       of counsel to settle the action, and concluded, upon a 
       detailed examination of the exhibits submitted with the 
       fee application, that the determined 18% was a 
       reasonable fee to counsel. 
 
        As said at oral argument, the Court does not credit 
       the unexplained and undetailed expenditure of 2500 
       hours by counsel--such is the equivalent of one 
       hundred and four 24-hour days, or three hundred and 
       twelve 8-hour days, or four hundred and sixteen 6- 
       hour days. How were such hours and such days 
       devoted to plaintiffs' cause? Such a considerable 
       amount of time cannot be unexplainable. The Court is 
       of the opinion that these hours merely serve as a 
       hindsight prop to the one-third percentage of plaintiffs' 
       recovery sought by counsel as their fee. Counsel had 
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       their opportunity to provide full information to the 
       Court upon their original submission. They did not. 
       And, interestingly, they did not even attempt to do so 
       by their motion for reconsideration. The motion for 
       reconsideration is denied. 
 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), 
at 2-3 (D. N.J. Dec. 29, 1999). 
 
Counsel timely appealed, challenging the District Court's 
reduction of their requested fee award. Defendants in the 
underlying litigation, as well as the named plaintiffs and 
unnamed members of the class, have elected not to 
participate in this appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. The District Court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1367; 18 U.S.C. SS 1964(a) and (c); and 




Counsel submit that the District Court abused its 
discretion in not awarding them their requested fee. They 
point to the several factors that district courts are charged 
with considering in awarding fees, and contend both that 
these factors militate in favor of Counsel's requested 
percentage fee, and that the District Court failed to take 
these factors into account in reaching its ultimate award 
decision. Our jurisprudence governing fee awards is well 
developed and familiar; and hence we relegate to the 
margin our recital of the factors that district courts should 
consider in awarding fees.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In common fund cases of this sort--in which the attorneys' fees and 
the clients' award come from the same source and the fees are based on 
a percentage amount of the clients' settlement award--district courts 
should consider several factors in setting a fee award. Among other 
things, these factors include: (1) the size of the fund created and the 
number of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence of substantial 
objections by members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees 
requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys 
involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk 
of 
nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' 
counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases. See In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. 
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Counsel also represent that in their initial fee application 
they offered to provide detailed billing records to 
substantiate the number of hours they billed to the 
plaintiffs' case, but that the District Court never asked to 
see these records, notwithstanding the Court's stated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 336-40 (3d Cir. 1998); In re 
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability 
Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 819-22 (3d Cir. 1995); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) S 24.121,at 207 (1997) (hereinafter 
"MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION"). In cases involving extremely large 
settlement awards--for example, those over one billion dollars--district 
courts are counseled to give these factors less weight. See In re 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 338-40. 
 
In mainstream cases, such as this one, we have also suggested that 
district courts cross-check the percentage award at which they arrive 
against the "lodestar" award method, which is normally employed in 
statutory fee-award cases. See id. at 333 (noting that "[t]he lodestar 
method is more commonly applied in statutory fee-shifting cases, and is 
designed to reward counsel for undertaking socially beneficial litigation 
in cases where the expected relief has a small enough monetary value 
that a percentage-of-recovery method would provide inadequate 
compensation"). A court determines an attorney's lodestar award by 
multiplying the number of hours he or she reasonably worked on a 
client's case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services given 
the geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the 
experience of the lawyer. See id. at 331 n.102; Court Awarded Attorney 
Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 243 (1985) 
(hereinafter "Task Force Report"). After arriving at this lodestar figure, 
the 
district court may, in certain circumstances, adjust the award upward or 
downward to reflect the particular circumstances of a given case. See In 
re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 338-40; In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 821- 
22. These calculations should be reduced to writing. See In re Prudential, 
148 F.3d at 340-41 (noting that courts must "take care to explain" how 
they apply the lodestar factor; "[w]ith no explanation for its 
application, 
we have no basis to evaluate it"); see also Task Force Report, 108 F.R.D. 
at 252-53; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, SS 24.121, 24.122, at 
206, 209-210. 
 
The eight factors listed above need not be applied in a formulaic way. 
Each case is different, and in certain cases, one factor may outweigh the 
rest. For reasons detailed below, what the district court is required to 
do 
before reaching such a conclusion is principally to explain why. See infra 
Sections II.A-B. 
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disbelief that Counsel worked the number of hours that 
they submitted they had. Counsel argue that the District 
Court abused its discretion in not crediting the number of 
hours Counsel worked without ever having reviewed these 
records or having them reviewed either by a special master 
or the Magistrate Judge who essentially managed the case 
through to settlement and handled the discovery. Before 
turning to the merits of these two arguments, we briefly 




We give great deal of deference to a district court's 
decision to set fees. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 782 (3d 
Cir. 1995); see also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) S 24.121, at 206 (1997) 
(hereinafter "MANUAL FOR COMPLEX  LITIGATION"). 
Notwithstanding our deferential standard of review, it is 
incumbent upon a district court to make its reasoning and 
application of the fee-awards jurisprudence clear, so that 
we, as a reviewing court, have a sufficient basis to review 
for abuse of discretion. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, 
supra, S 24.121, at 206 ("The court awarding [attorneys' 
fees] should articulate reasons for the selection of the given 
percentage sufficient to enable a reviewing court to 
determine whether the percentage selected is reasonable.") 
(collecting cases). 
 
Though a district court may have many good reasons to 
set or reduce a proposed fee award, if those reasons are not 
explicated, at least in some meaningful degree, we can 
arrive at one of only two conclusions: either (1) that the 
district court had good reasons based on the factors 
enumerated, supra, in footnote 1 to award the fees that it 
did; or (2) that it ignored those factors and picked an award 
figure arbitrarily. Either way, if the district court's fee- 
award opinion is so terse, vague, or conclusory that we 
have no basis to review it, we must vacate the fee-award 
order and remand for further proceedings. See Court 
Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task 
Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 245 (1985) (hereinafter"Task Force 
Report") (noting that "conclusory statements [denying or 
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setting award figures] often are subject to reversal and 
remand"). For us to act as seers and to attempt to soothsay 
what was on the district court's mind when setting a fee 
award is a waste of judicial resources. 
 
Moreover, if a district court does not fulfill its duty to 
apply the relevant legal precepts to a fee application, it 
abuses its discretion by not exercising it. See Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) ("It remains important 
. . . for the district court to provide a concise but clear 
explanation of its reasons for the fee award."). As the Third 
Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded Attorney Fees noted, 
 
       "district courts, in awarding attorneys' fees, may not 
       reduce an award by a particular percentage or amount 
       (albeit for justifiable reasons) in an arbitrary or 
       indiscriminate fashion. If the court believes that a fee 
       reduction . . . is indicated, it must analyze the 
       circumstances requiring the reduction and its relation to 
       the fee, and it must make specific findings to support its 
       action." 
 
Id. at 253 (quoting Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 
F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 478 




The problem in this case is that the District Court dealt 
with the fee-award issue in a cursory and conclusory 
fashion. The Court spent little more than a few sentences in 
its two opinions analyzing the fee-award issue in this case. 
See supra Section I.B (reproducing, in its entirety, the 
Court's analysis of the fee-award issue). Even after reading 
the District Court's opinions, it remains difficult to discern 
both how the Court arrived at the 18% award figure, and 
why it reached certain other conclusions that it did. The 
Court mentioned the costs award factors that a court 
should consider in such circumstances, but did not apply 
any of the factors, at least insofar as we can ascertain. 
 
The Court's analysis in its two opinions therefore 
constitutes an abuse of discretion for two principal reasons. 
First, the Court's statements (reproduced in the margin2) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), 
at 3 (D. N.J. Nov. 16, 1999) ("This court has carefully reviewed the 
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that it reviewed the record and applied the relevant case 
law are an ipse dixit insofar as they are unsupported by 
careful analysis explicated in written opinions or rulings 
from the bench. Even trusting the verity of such 
statements, they give us little, as a reviewing court, with 
which to work. Unfortunately, a large part of the District 
Court's analysis consisted of such statements, which in our 
view, do not constitute sufficiently "articulate[d] reasons for 
the selection of a given [fee] percentage . . . ." MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, S 24.121, at 206. 
 
Second, and more importantly, when the Court did 
reference the fee-award factors in its opinions, it neither 
engaged those factors nor explained its reasoning. In the 
entirety of its analysis of the issue in its first opinion, the 
Court wrote: "[1] The nature of this litigation, [2] its 
resolution at this stage without the necessity of trial, [3] the 
nature of the settlement, and [4] its value, convince the 
court that it would place a reasonable burden on the class 
to award attorneys' fees of 18% of the Settlement Fund, or 
$1,700,000." Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp. , Civ. No. 
95-438 (WHW) (D. N.J. Nov. 16, 1999) (numbers added). In 
its opinion denying Counsel's motion for reconsideration, 
the Court advanced a fifth reason for awarding the fee it 
did. It expressed disbelief that Counsel worked the number 
of hours they claimed they did on behalf of the class. See 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), 
at 2-3 (D. N.J. Dec. 29, 1999). In the next Section, we 
address, in turn, each of these enumerated considerations, 
as well as the District Court's ultimate conclusion. In so 
doing, we explain why each factor was given too short shrift 
or was misapplied. We also mention certain factors the 
Court did not consider, but should have. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
submissions of the plaintiffs' counsel, their stated efforts required to 
settle this litigation, and number of hours expended."); Gunter v. 
Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), at 2 (D. N.J. Dec. 29, 
1999) ("The Court considered all relevant factors at the time the fee was 
set, including the lodestar and the efforts of counsel to settle the 
action, 
and concluded, upon a detailed examination of the exhibits submitted 
with the fee application, that the determined 18% was a reasonable fee 
to counsel."). 
 






The complexity and duration of the litigation is thefirst 
factor a district court can and should consider in awarding 
fees. See supra note 1. From all appearances, this was a 
complex case, involving the intersection of federal and state 
law, common and public law, and more specifically 
securities law, RICO, oil and gas law, and myriad state law 
claims. The case was actively litigated for over four-and-a- 
half years, and Counsel were forced to file motions dealing 
with, inter alia, class certification, complicated discovery 
disputes, and the vagaries of RICO statute-of-limitations 
law. Moreover, according to Counsel's representations, they 
not only deposed numerous witnesses, but also consulted 
many experts in the field, and successfully defended 
against a summary judgment motion that was bolstered by 
authority from other jurisdictions that apparently 
supported the defendants' litigation position. 
 
In reducing Counsel's fee request from 33 1/3% to 18% 
the District Court did not say that this was an 
uncomplicated matter or one of a relatively short duration 
as compared to similar cases; it merely mentioned the 
"complexity and duration" factor. Perhaps the Court could 
have reached such a reasoned conclusion, as it is more 
familiar with this litigation than this court, even though we 
have taken pains to review the extensive record. But 
without that type of statement in the District Court's 
opinion, it would seem that the "complexity and duration" 
factor would weigh in Counsel's favor. Therefore, we cannot 
confidently rely on this factor when, in accordance with our 
deferential standard of review, we endeavor to accede to the 
judgment of the District Court.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In reaching this conclusion, we note that it is the practice in the 
District Court in New Jersey, unlike, for example, in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, for magistrate judges to manage cases, even of this size, 
before they proceed to trial. Given this arrangement--and the greater 
familiarity of magistrate judges with the complexity and quality of 
lawyering in cases that do not reach trial--district courts in such 
districts might wish to consider referring fee and cost applications to 
the 
magistrate judge familiar with the case for a report and recommendation, 








The second factor that the District Court invoked in its 
initial opinion was the fact that this case was resolved via 
settlement without the need to go to trial. For reasons 
explained below, if the Court relied on this fact to deny 
Counsel their requested fee award, it misapplied the law. 
Commentators discussing fee awards have correctly noted 
that "one purpose of the percentage method" of awarding 
fees--rather than the lodestar method, which arguably 
encourages lawyers to run up their billable hours--"is to 
encourage early settlements by not penalizing efficient 
counsel . . . ." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, 
S 24.121, at 207 (citing 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS S 14.03, at 14-3 to 14-7 (3d ed. 
1992)). 
 
If the District Court, in fact, denied Counsel their 
requested fee award merely because Counsel were able to 
settle this complicated matter, then the Court ignored the 
stated goal in percentage fee-award cases of "ensuring that 
competent counsel continue to be willing to undertake 
risky, complex, and novel litigation." Id.  (citing Deposit 
Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980) 
(recognizing the importance of a financial incentive to entice 
qualified attorneys to devote their time to complex, time- 
consuming cases in which they risk non-payment)). 
Procuring a settlement, in and of itself, is never a factor 
that the district court should rely upon to reduce a fee 
award. To utilize such a factor would penalize efficient 
counsel, encourage costly litigation, and potentially 
discourage able lawyers from taking such cases. 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. That is not to say that when a case settles counsel do not reduce the 
risk of losing at trial, avoid non-recovery, and limit the number of hours 
that they will ultimately devote to a case. But the risk of nonpayment 
and the amount of time devoted to a case by counsel are separate factors 
that should not be conflated with the outcome of a particular case. See 
supra note 1; see also infra Sections II.C.4-5 (discussing the "risk of 
nonpayment" and the "amount of time devoted" factors). 
 




The size of the settlement fund created and the number 
of persons benefitted is another important factor in fee- 
award cases; so too is comparing awards in similar cases. 
See supra note 1. The District Court's reference to the 
"nature of the settlement" in this case and"its value," 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), 
at 2 (D. N.J. Nov. 16, 1999)--without any analysis of 
whether the $9.5 million that Counsel were able to procure 
from the defendants was a favorable settlement for the 
plaintiffs in view of the problems of this litigation, or as 
compared to similar cases--does little to justify the Court's 
decision to limit Counsel's requested fee award. Therefore, 
based on the record before us and the reasons (not) 
explicated in the District Court's opinion, the"size and 
nature of the settlement award" do not appear to be an 
adequate basis for the District Court's reduction of fees. 
That is not to say that such a basis does not exist, or that 
the Court did not have good reasons, which it did not 
articulate, for reducing Counsel's fee award to 18%. In a 
fully explicated opinion, the District Court could articulate 
the soundness of its reasoning.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that during the hearing on Counsel's motion to reconsider, 
the Court stated that it "had, in its own experience, determined that 
percentage bases much lower than 18 percent are quite appropriate." 
Transcript of Proceedings filed Feb. 28, 2000, Gunter v. Ridgewood 
Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), at 6 (D. N.J.). This citationless 
determination not only seems inconsistent with developed case law, it 
does not amount to comparing explicitly the fee award in this case to 
those awarded in similar cases--the mode of analysis that we believe 
necessary when applying this factor. 
 
In assessing "size of the settlement" factor and whether the settlement 
was favorable to the plaintiffs and class members, the District Court may 
also want to determine what percentage of the plaintiffs' and class 
members' approximated actual damages the settlementfigure represents. 
See Entin v. Barg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1976). This figure, 
when viewed in context of the risk of non-recovery, see id. at 517-18, 
may be helpful in determining how well counsel did for their clients, cf. 
supra Section I.A (discussing representations made by Counsel regarding 
the size of the plaintiffs' and class members' losses). 
 




We turn next to two factors that the District Court did 
not analyze or at least mention in its two brief opinions. As 
noted above, no one in the class objected to Counsel's 
request for fees. Yet, a client's views regarding her 
attorneys' performance and their request for fees should be 
considered when determining a fee award. See supra note 
1. Additionally, it seems that the risk of non-payment in 
this case was present both because the defendants were 
close to insolvency, and because other classes of plaintiffs 
in similar cases against the defendants had lost on similar 
legal theories. As noted above, the risk that counsel takes 
in prosecuting a client's case should also be considered 
when assessing a fee award. See id. In this case, the 
District Court should have paid attention to these factors, 





The last two factors the District Court referenced in its 
order denying Counsel's motion to reconsider were the 
lodestar cross-checking factor and the amount of time 
Counsel devoted to their clients' case. See supra note 1 
(discussing these factors). In common fund cases, such as 
this one, we have suggested that it is advisable to cross- 
check the percentage award counsel asks for against the 
lodestar method of awarding fees so as to insure that 
plaintiffs' lawyers are not receiving an excessive fee at their 
clients' expense. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 340-41 (3d Cir. 1998); In re 
General Motors, 55 F.3d at 820, 821 n.40, 822; see also 
infra note 6 (discussing the important role that district 
courts play in safeguarding the interests of plaintiffs and 
class members when awarding attorneys' fees in cases of 
this sort). As we have explained, a court determines the 
lodestar by multiplying the number of hours counsel 
reasonably worked on a client's case by a reasonable hourly 
billing rate for such services in a given geographical area 
provided by a lawyer of comparable experience. See In re 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 331 n.102; Task Force Report, 108 
F.R.D. at 243. 
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Unfortunately, in this case, the District Court neither 
reduced its lodestar calculation to writing, nor gave 
Counsel a chance to justify their hours billed or their 
hourly rates. In its opinion denying Counsel's motion to 
reconsider, the Court stated that it had considered the 
lodestar factor in arriving at its original fee award. See 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), 
at 2 (D. N.J. Dec. 29, 1999). Nowhere, however, in the 
Court's original fee-award opinion is the lodestar factor 
even mentioned, much less analyzed. Gunter v. Ridgewood 
Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), at 3 (D. N.J. Nov. 16, 
1999). To examine the lodestar factor properly, a Court 
should make explicit findings about how much time 
counsel reasonably devoted to a given matter, and what a 
reasonable hourly fee would be for such services. See supra 
note 1; see also In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 340-41; Task 
Force Report, 108 F.R.D. at 252-53; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, supra, S 24.122, at 209-10. The District Court 
made none of these findings in its original opinion, nor did 
it, in its subsequent opinion, explicitly use a lodestar figure 
to cross-check against the 18% figure it reached. In merely 
adverting to its consideration of the lodestar factor in the 
second opinion, and not analyzing or applying it, the 
District Court failed to exercise its discretion in such a way 
that an appellate court could possibly review that decision. 
 
Counsel's original fee application included all of the 
information necessary to do this cross-checking analysis 
and to determine how much time Counsel devoted to their 
clients' case. As is customary in these cases, Counsel 
submitted extensive briefing and affidavits detailing the 
hours they spent on the instant litigation, see  App. at 91- 
150, listing the number of hours each lawyer, paralegal, 
and law clerk worked on the case, see id. at 134-35, 148, 
and providing documentation supporting the hourly billing 
rates for which they applied, see id. at 171-74. Rather than 
submit their actual time records, which were voluminous 
and maintained by Counsel, Counsel informed the District 
Court that such records "were available for review by the 
Court in the event the Court wishes to do so." Id. at 122, 
P 91. Waiting to submit such detailed records until they 
were requested by the Court seems consonant with the 
practice in this circuit. See, e.g., In re Prudential, 148 F.3d 
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at 332 n.107 (noting that "time summaries" were adjudged 
sufficient in a case in which "the court was only using 
lodestar analysis as a cross check on the fee award"); id. at 
338, 342 (noting further that the district court could permit 
discovery or request further documentation to verify the 
statements made in a fee application). 
 
Somewhat inexplicably, however, the District Court 
rejected the representations made in Counsel's application 
without requesting or reviewing these additional records, or 
giving Counsel any indication, before issuing its second 
opinion, that the Court doubted the veracity of Counsel's 
claims regarding the number of hours that they expended. 
Refusing to credit 2500 of the 8424.9 hours submitted by 
Counsel, and, in the process, chastising Counsel for not 
explaining and detailing their expenditure of hours, the 
Court wrote: 
 
       [T]he Court does not credit the unexplained and 
       undetailed expenditure of 2500 hours by counsel-- 
       such is the equivalent of one hundred and four 24- 
       hour days, or three hundred and twelve 8-hour days, 
       or four hundred and sixteen 6-hour days. See 
       Sternberg Aff. Ex. A (2500 hours expended through 
       June 30, 1999); Meyers Aff. Ex. B (440 hours expended 
       through June 30, 1999). How were such hours and 
       such days devoted to plaintiffs' cause? Such a 
       considerable amount of time cannot be unexplainable. 
       The Court is of the opinion that these hours merely 
       serve as a hindsight prop to the one-third percentage of 
       plaintiffs' recovery sought by counsel as their fee. 
       Counsel had their opportunity to provide full 
       information to the Court upon their original 
       submission. They did not. And, interestingly, they did 
       not even attempt to do so by their motion for 
       reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration is 
       denied. 
 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW) 
(D. N.J. Dec. 29, 1999). 
 
The Court's statements are called into question by 
Counsel's representations in their fee application that they 
would provide the Court with these records if the Court so 
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requested, see App. at 122, P 91; hence, the Court's 
decision to discount 2500 hours that Mr. Sternberg worked 
without reference to Counsel's proffer seems arbitrary, if 
not contrary to the facts in the record. Counsel summarized 
the hours that Mr. Sternberg worked with no less 
documentation and in no less detail than that of the other 
6000 hours submitted by Counsel. In its first opinion in 
this matter and during the hearings regarding the fee- 
award issue, the Court never expressed any disbelief that 
Counsel had devoted as much time to this case as they had 
represented they had in their initial fee application. 
Therefore, without further elaboration on the matter by the 
District Court, it is impossible for us to discern why the 
Court chose not to credit the number of hours Mr. 
Sternberg declared that he worked on this case. Similarly, 
it would have been difficult for Counsel to have known that 
they should have departed from the usual practice of 
submitting time report summaries and presented their time 
support documentation in their entirety. Fundamental 
fairness requires that Counsel have been given the 
opportunity to make this proffer before the court rejected 
Counsel's representations out of hand. 
 
Moreover, according to Counsel's representations, Mr. 
Sternberg is a seasoned class action attorney who"played 
a major part in many of the most significant class actions 
prosecuted" by his firm, which itself has appeared in many 
major class actions. App. at 141. It is not implausible that 
as a major partner working on this case for four-and-one- 
half years he would have billed 2500 hours in the matter. 
Partners and associates in large law firms involved in 
complex litigation often bill that many hours in a single 
year. Even assuming that he worked on several other 
matters during those four and one-half years, it is not 
prima facie unbelievable that he would have devoted so 
many hours to the plaintiffs' and class members'file. 
 
The District Court may well have good reason to discredit 
Counsel's representations regarding Mr. Sternberg, but not 
without first having reviewed Counsel's time records, 
inquiring into other cases Mr. Sternberg was working on at 
the same time, and documenting the reasons why it did not 
believe Counsel's representations. Even if Mr. Sternberg did 
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not work 2500 hours on the case, the record reflects that 
he devoted some amount of time to the named plaintiffs' 
and class members' cause. The record reveals, for example, 
that Mr. Sternberg made appearances and arguments in 
this matter. See, e.g., Transcript of Motions, Gunter v. 
Ridgewood Energy Corp., Civ. No. 95-438 (WHW), at 37 (D. 
N.J. Sept. 9, 1999). Therefore, the District Court should not 
have discounted his hours altogether. And even if the Court 
were merely reducing the overall hours figure by 2500 
hours as a penalty to Counsel for misrepresenting the 
number of hours certain lawyers worked on this case, the 
Court should have said so, so that we could review that 




In sum, the District Court abused its discretion in this 
case by not exercising it; and when it did exercise it, by 
misapplying our jurisprudence. We will therefore vacate the 
order appealed from and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. In so doing, we express no 
opinion as to what award should ultimately be fixed.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We do note that district courts can avoid many of complications 
associated with fee awards by setting fee guidelines and ground rules 
early in the litigation process. Such ground rules may include: 
developing means of record keeping that facilitate judicial review; 
providing for periodic reports or status conferences at which counsel can 
apprise the court of their efforts; establishing a reasonable hourly rate 
at 
which counsel can bill their clients for certain services; and capping the 
amount of time that counsel or certain lawyers staffing the case may 
spend on a particular matter or issue if they expect to be compensated 
for all of their efforts. Keeping track of counsel's progress can prevent 
lawyers from padding their hours or having high priced counsel perform 
menial tasks. It also allows the court to digest smaller amounts of 
information at regular intervals, and it gives counsel a better 
understanding of what the court thinks is reasonable in terms of 
expenditures and hours billed. Learned treatises on the subject provide 
helpful suggestions for setting these ground rules and following through 
on them. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, SS 24.2-24.214, 
at 211-14. 
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Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Another approach is for the district court to determine the fee 
arrangement in advance through competitive bidding. See, e.g., In re 
Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1192-1201 (N.D. 
Ill. 1996) (Shadur, J.) (employing this approach); In re Cendant Corp. 
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 150-52 (D.N.J. 1998) (Walls, J.) (same); In re 
Wells 
Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 468-77 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Walker, J.) 
(same). This device appears to have worked well, and we commend it to 
district judges within this circuit for their consideration. 
 
At all events, whatever approach district courts choose to adopt they 
must safeguard the plaintiffs and class members' interests, because as 
is often the case (and as it was here), an attorneys' fee motion filed by 
successful counsel in a common fund award case goes unopposed. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs' rights need special protection. See Lindy Bros. 
Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Co., 487 F.2d 161, 
168 (3d Cir. 1973), aff 'd in part and vacated in part, 540 F.2d 102 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (en banc), (" `[U]nless time spent and skill displayed be used 
as a constant check on applications for fees there is a grave danger that 
the bar and bench will be brought into disrepute, and that there will be 
prejudice to those whose substantive interests are at stake and who are 
unrepresented except by the very lawyers who are seeking 
compensation.' ") (quoting Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 
55, 61 (D. Mass. 1963)). To that end, a district court that suspects that 
the plaintiffs' rights in a particular case are not being adequately 
vindicated may appoint counsel, a special master, or an expert to review 
or challenge the fee application filed by plaintiffs' attorneys. 
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